Memorandum

TO

Mr. E. S. Miller

FROM

F. S. Putman, Jr.

SUBJECT:

CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT TERRORISM

1 - F. S. Putman, Jr.

DATE: 5/23/73

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 984922-12005 BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

Mr. Felt
Mr. Baker
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Gebhardt
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller, E.S
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Thompson
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Baise
Mr. Barnes
Mr. Bowers
Mr. Herington
Mr. Conmy
Mr. Mintz
Mr. Eardley
Mrs. Hogan

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Referral/Direct

	Captioned Committee met on 5/23/73 and a conv of
	the minutes are attached. Also attached is
T	It was the recommendation of the
_	Committee to follow these new relaxed instructions. It does not
	appear that this will affect the FBI in any manner.

Enclosed is a rundown of the briefing of recently kidnapped in the Guadalajara area,

Also enclosed is procedures to be considered for dealing with terrorist acts against American officials abroad. Ambassador Meyer requested any comments at the next meeting of anyone who had any suggestions to this procedure. This appears to be a contingency plan for the foreign embassies and no suggestions are needed from the FBI.

PENCLOSURE ATTACHEDS

REC. 84

DEM

62-115360-31

MAY 29 1973

TOTAL OSURE ATTACHEDS

MAY 29 1973

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 1942 EDITION GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

то

Mr. Gebhardt

FROM

SUBJECT:

R. F. Bates

CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT TERRORISM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 06-05-2006 BY 60309 au DATE Augustel6, 1973

1 - Mr. Gebhardt

1 - Mr. Bates

1 - Mr. F.S. Putman

1 - Mr. E.S. Miller

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Assoc. Dir. Asst. Dir.:

Admin.

Comp. Syst.

Inspection Patall. _ Laboratory

Spec. Inv. _

Training _ Legal Coun.

Cong. Serv.

Corr. & Crm. Research

Press Off. _ Telephone Rm. ___ Director Sec'y _

Files & Com. Gen. Inv.

Plan. & Eval. __

Reference is made to memorandum of F. S. Putman to E. S. Miller, dated August 3, 1973, advising that representatives of the Rand Corporation, Steven To Hosmer, Deputy Vice President, National Security Research, The Rand Corporation, 2100 M. Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. desired to discuss with 20037, and representatives of the Bureau hostage situations in relationship to kidnapings in connection with a research paper they were preparing.

Mr. Hosmer and met with myself, Inspector Richard J. Gallagher, and other representatives of the General Investigative Division on August 14, 1973. They were fully briefed on the many problems that exist in attempting to handle a kidnaping or hostage situation. They were advised that no set pattern can be established in the handling of these cases as each one is different and pretty much has to be "played by ear." They were very receptive to the presentation and felt the discussion would be extremely helpful to them. FX-105

ACTION:

For information.

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<u> 10</u>-27-2005 Chassified by 60309 auc tam/mlt/ OFFICE OF PCTING DIRECTOR "DECLASSIFY $\phi N: 25 \times 3.3(1)$ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION BISAD-27-2020 INFORMATION CONTAINED UNCLASSIFIED EXC QWN OTHERWISE OIV. I TO COOPDINATE 10:60 P Harr) warins I T I worked with SAC WFO to do a game plan as to has to house 62.115360 32 III JUN 13 1973 The amount or done protage som as possible 7 I would like To attend a contigue of the Elevens CLASSIFIED BY GDS CATECOTY STATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE 67 JUN 1 4 1973

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STICE

To: Mr. Kinley

subject.

Terrorism

My questions are:

be supervised by GID?

DMA:nm

November 14, 1972

Re: Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism

Re memo of 11/10/72 to Mr. E. S.

Miller from W. O. Cregar on this

note two questions concerning the

ALL INFORMATION

As you have requested I have initialed MS. HERWIG this memorandum. However, I would MRS. NEEN AN _

division of responsibility between DID and GID for supervising investigations of violations of the new statute protecting foreign officials and guests.

These questions are submitted for information only in view of the fact that the allocation of responsibility

(1) Does not a murder or a kidnaping investigation require certain investigative expertise in all cases without regard to whether 'political consideration,

(2) If so, does DID, given the nature of its responsi-

subversion or terrorist activity" is involved?

bilities, have the expertise to supervise these criminal investigations as effectively as they could

has already been acted upon by Mr. Gray.

HEREIN IS UNCLASSMET TEBBARDT -

MR. BISHOP

MR. BAKER

MR. CALLAHAN'_

CMANDERA BENELL

BMR. KENKINSO-MR. MARSHALL .

MR. MILLER, E.S. __ MR. PURVIS ___

MR. SOYARS MR. WALTERS ___

TELE ROOM

MR. ARMSTRONG _____

MR. KINLEY ___

Concerning the above two questions, I confess to an opinion that they should be answered in favor of GID. It is not my desire to build up one Division at the expense of another, and if I ever become aware of a situation in which it seems that another Division is assuming responsibility for something which I believe falls more nearly within the expertise of DID, I would expect then to speak in favor of DID.

D. M. Armstrong, III

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	r. Baker			Dunphy	
	r. Bishop	•		M. A. Jo	nes.
	r.Callahan			Malmfeld	
M ₁	r. Cleveland		Mr.	Donahoe	
M1	r. Conrad	_		Kinley	
M1	r. Dalbey	\mathcal{D}	Mr.	Armstron	g
	r. Gebhardt			. Herwig	
Ma	r. Jenkins			-	
Mı	r. Marshall				
	r. Miller, E.S.	ı			
	r. Purvis			•	b6
	r. Soyars				b7C
M:	r. Walters			· 	
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David D. Kinley Ext. 3457

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

$\it Aemorandum$

TO E. S. Miller

FROM

SUBJECT

ABINET COMMITTEE TO

COMBAT TERRORISM

11/10/72 DATE:

> 1 - Mr. Cregar 1 - Mr. Belanger

- Mr. E.S. Miller

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10-27-2005 BY 60309

Felt. Baker -Bates Bishop Callahan Cleveland -Conrad Dalbey Jenkins Marshall Miller, E.S. Ponder . Sovars Walters Tele. Room _ Mr. Kinley .. Mr. Armstrong _ Ms. Herwig ___ Mrs. Neenan ___

auc tam/mlt/elh Reference is made to a memorandum from W.O. Cregar to Mr. E.S. Miller dated 10/30/72, captioned as above, wherein it was noted that a Headquarters contingency plan would be prepared by the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) and submitted for Mr. Gray's approval. Attached contingency plan is being submitted for Mr. Gray's approval.

As noted in a memorandum dated 10/27/72, captioned "Act for Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States," the DID and the General Investigative Division (GID) proposed that responsibility of each Division regarding the subject statute be divided as follows:

- (1) GID will handle all violations of the Act assigned to the FBI by the Department of Justice where there is no indication of political consideration, subversion or terrorist activity but will handle all plane hijacking cases.
- (2) DID will handle all violations of the Act assigned to the FBI by the Department where indications exist that political consideration, subversion or terrorist activity are involved in the violation, exclusive of plane hijackings.

Mr. Gray approved the Division of responsibility for \textstyle the new legislation as noted above on 11/1/72.

The enclosed DID contingency plan will be utilized to the extent necessary in the event of a terrorist act, supervision of which rests with DID. It will be noted that the appendices of the contingency plan will include documents pertaining to applicable legislation, Departmental guidelines, agreements between the FBI and other U. S. Government agencies, agreements between DID and GID, and other material deemed to be of assistance to personnel These documents will be added to the handling these matters. appendices as received.

Enclosure

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1 JUN 13 1973

STANDARD ON BULKY BAMP

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller RE: CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT TERRORISM

ACTION:

If Mr. Gray approves the enclosed DID contingency plan, the following action will be taken:

- (1) Copies of the contingency plan will be furnished to all personnel having responsibilities under the plan.
- (2) The master copy of the plan will be maintained in DID Duty Supervisor's Office, Room 1002, 9&D Building.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10-27-2005 BY 60309 auc.tam/mlt/elh

ACT FOR THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN
OFFICIALS AND OFFICIAL GUESTS
OF THE UNITED STATES

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION CONTINGENCY PLAN

62-115360-33

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NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES

Both the Intelligence Division (ID) and the General Investigative Division (GDI) have responsibility for supervising violations coming within the purview of "Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States." In the main, ID responsibilities under the Act involve terrorist acts where violence is used, or the serious and imminent threat of such an act requiring immediate reaction; provided that the act has international political ramifications either because of its purpose or because of the individuals involved.

GID supervisory responsibilities are incurred upon a serious violation of the Act, such as a nonpolitically motivated or nonsubversive kidnaping, murder, or assault and the like upon a victim covered by the Act. GID also handles all aircraft hijackings under the Act.

In the event of a serious violation of the Act supervised by ID, the following notification procedures will be adhered to, and the contingency plan hereinafter set forth will be activated. In the case of a violation of the Act supervised by ID, the following notification procedures will be followed.

Notify:

- (a) Assistant Director W. Raymond Wannall, who will notify Mr. Miller, who, in turn, will notify Mr. Callahan, who will notify Mr. Kelley.
- (b) Assistant Director R. E. Gebhardt. GID
- (c) Section Chief F. S. Putman, Jr., who will notify Inspector A. J. Decker, Jr.
- (d) Deputy Director for Operations

 Department of State Operations Center (DSOC)
- (e) White House Situation Room

(f) Secret Service Intelligence Division

(g) Section Chief. Criminal Section, GID, extention or during nonworking hours, GID Duty Supervisor, extension

	(h) (Div. 5) or	his
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alternate, b6
b7c
(Div. 6), who are members of the Emergency
Watch Group at the State Department.

(i) Department of Justice Information Center

Note that thereafter in each case, as a double check, b2 the DSOC will, in turn, notify the FBI, The White House b6 Situation Room, Secret Service Intelligence Division, and the National Security Agency Command Center. In its return call to the FBI, the DSOC will maintain an open line.

· ·	Mr. Putman will han		
I I II	(home in these matters.	Department of Justice, telephone	

ID Command Center

Location

The ID Command Center, hereinafter referred to as IDCC, will be located in Room 1002, 9th & D Building, telephone extentions 2078 and 2079.

Chain of Command

The IDCC will be under the direct supervision of Assistant Director Wannall. Assisting Mr. Wannall will be Inspector A. J. Decker, Jr., and in charge of coordinating the case and all incoming and outgoing communications will be Section Chief F. S. Putman, Jr.,

Manpower

At IDCC

- (1) Section Chief, CI-3
- (2) Unit Chief and Supervisor handling these matters
- (3) Security Patrol Clerks (2) (After duty hours only)
- (4) Clerk Stenographers (2)

At other locations

(1) Supervisory Special Agents from Sections affected and as needed

2/6/14

(2) Sufficient clerical and stenographic personnel to be assigned if possible from CI-3 Section.

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(3) Upon proper notification,

ID, or his alternate,

GID, members of Emergency Watch Group (EWG) will proceed to the DSOC, Room 7516 of the State

Department. Supervisor or can be reached by use of the direct line to the DSOC and will receive all information flowing between the FBI and the EWG.

Communications

Telephone

Bureau extensions 2078 and 2079 presently serve IDCC.

Extensions 2121, 2122, and 2123 are extensions contiguous to IDCC and can be used as back up extensions. The main telephone instrument has unclassified extension service to The White House Situation Room. Two extension instruments have a direct unclassified extension to the Department of State Operations Center extension

Extension telephones also have extension service to the Guard Desk in the lobby of the 9th and D Building.

In addition to the above, the "Green" telephone and the "Grey" telephone provide secure voice service to the United States intelligence community. The "Green" telephone may be used for classified conversations with certain Legats.

Teletype

The ID teletype room adjacent to IDCC operates on an around-the-clock basis.

Radio

Portable voice radio receivers-transmitters connect the messenger room at Justice with IDCC and the courier truck.

Appended hereto are documents pertaining to applicable legislation, Departmental guidelines, agreements between the FBI and other U.S. Government agencies, agreements between ID and GID personnel handling these matters.

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APPENDICES

- Appendix A H. R. 15883 "Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States."
- Appendix B Memorandum T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller dated October 27, 1972 - "Act for Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States."
- Appendix C Memorandum dated December 19, 1972, Deputy Attorney
 General, Criminal Division, to Acting Director "Assignment of Investigative Jurisdiction."
- Appendix D Memorandum dated October 27, 1972, from Ambassador Armin Meyer, Department of State, regarding "Administrative Machinery for Dealing with Terrorist Acts" and enclosing "Standard Procedures for Responding to International Terrorist Acts Occurring Within the United States" as approved by the Working Group, Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism.
- Appendix E Letter dated November 10, 1972, setting forth agreement between the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense concerning assistance from the Department of Defense to the FBI in connection with acts of terrorism and related memorandum dated 3/13/73.
- Appendix F Department of Defense (DOD) teletypes May 18, 1973, and August 13, 1973, concerning DOD support to the FBI in combating terrorism.
- Appendix G Correspondence concerning the Department of Justice Information Center.

8/17/73

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

Pinety-second Congress of the United States of America

AT THE SECOND SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, the eighteenth day of January, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-two

An Art

To amend title 18, United States Code, to provide for expanded protection of foreign officials, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States".

STATEMENT OF FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF POLICY

SEC. 2. The Congress recognizes that from the beginning of our history as a nation, the police power to investigate, prosecute, and punish common crimes such as murder, kidnaping, and assault has resided in the several States, and that such power should remain with the States

The Congress finds, however, that harassment, intimidation, obstruction, coercion, and acts of violence committed against foreign officials or their family members in the United States or against official guests of the United States adversely affect the foreign relations of the United States.

Accordingly, this legislation is intended to afford the United States jurisdiction concurrent with that of the several States to proceed against those who by such acts interfere with its conduct of foreign affairs.

TITLE I-MURDER OR MANSLAUGHTER OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS AND OFFICIAL GUESTS

SEC. 101. Chapter 51 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sections:

"§ 1116. Murder or manslaughter of foreign officials or official

"(a) Whoever kills a foreign official or official guest shall be punished as provided under sections 1111 and 1112 of this title, except that any such person who is found guilty of murder in the first degree shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life.

"(b) For the purpose of this section 'foreign official' means-"(1) a Chief of State or the political equivalent, President, Vice President, Prime Minister, Ambassador, Foreign Minister, or other officer of cabinet rank or above of a foreign government or the chief executive officer of an international organization, or any person who has previously served in such capacity, and any member of his family, while in the United States; and

"(2) any person of a foreign nationality who is duly notified to the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign government or international organization, and who is in the United States on official business, and any member of his family whose presence in the United States is in connection with the presence of such offer or employee.

(c) For the purpose of this section:
"(1) Foreign government means the government of a foreign country, irrespective of recognition by the United States.

"(2) 'International organization' mesus a public international organization designated as such pursuant to section 1 of the International Organizations Immunities Act (22 U.S.C. 288).

"(3) 'Family' includes (a) a spouse, parent, brother or sister,

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child, or person to whom the foreign official stands in loco parentis, or (b) any other person living in his household and related to the foreign official by blood or marriage.

"(4) 'Official guest' means a citizen or national of a foreign country present in the United States as an official guest of the government of the United States pursuant to designation as such by the Secretary of State.

"§ 1117. Conspiracy to murder

"If two or more persons conspire to violate section 1111, 1114, or 1116 of this title, and one or more of such persons do any overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life."

Sec. 102. The analysis of chapter 51 of title 18, United States Code. is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new items:

"1116. Murder or manslaughter of foreign officials or official guests. "1117. Conspiracy to murder."

TITLE II—KIDNAPING

SEC. 201. Section 1201 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

"§ 1201. Kidnaping

"(a) Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person, except in the case of a minor by the parent thereof, when:

"(1) the person is willfully transported in interstate or foreign

commerce;

"(2) any such act against the person is done within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States;

"(3) any such act against the person is done within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States as defined in section 101 (32) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended (49 U.S.C. 1301(32)); or

"(4) the person is a foreign official as defined in section 1116(b) or an official guest as defined in section 1116(c) (4) of this title,

shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life. "(b) With respect to subsection (a) (1), above, the failure to release the victim within twenty-four hours after he shall have been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnaped, abducted, or carried away shall create a rebuttable presumption that such person has been transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

(c) If two or more persons conspire to violate this section and one or more of such persons do any overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years

or for life."

SEC. 202. The analysis of chapter 55 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by deleting

"1201. Transportation.",

and substituting the following:

"1201. Kidnaping."

H.R. 15883-3

TITLE III—PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS AND OFFICIAL CUESTS

Sec. 301. Section 112 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

*§ 112. Protection of foreign officials and official guests

"(a) Whoever assaults, strikes, wounds, imprisons, or offers violence to a foreign official or official guest shall be fined not more than \$5,000, or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. Whoever in the commission of any such act uses a deadly or dangerous weapon shall be fined not more than \$10,000, or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

"(b) Whoever willfully intimidates, coerces, threatens, or harasses a foreign official or an official guest, or willfully obstructs a foreign official in the performance of his duties, shall be fined not more than

\$500, or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.

"(c) Whoever within the United States but outside the District of Columbia and within one hundred feet of any building or premises belonging to or used or occupied by a foreign government or by a foreign official for diplomatic or consular purposes, or as a mission to an international organization, or as a residence of a foreign official, or belonging to or used or occupied by an international organization for official business or residential purposes, publicly—

"(1) parades, pickets, displays any flag, banner, sign, placard, or device, or utters any word, phrase, sound, or noise, for the purpose of intimidating, coercing, threatening, or harassing any foreign official or obstructing him in the performance of his

duties, or

"(2) congregates with two or more other persons with the intent to perform any of the aforesaid acts or to violate subsection (a) or (b) of this section,

shall be fined not more than \$500, or imprisoned not more than six

months, or both.

"(d) For the purpose of this section 'foreign official', 'foreign government', 'international organization', and 'official guest' shall have the same meanings as those provided in sections 1116 (b) and (c) of this title

"(e) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed or applied so as to abridge the exercise of rights guaranteed under the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States."

SEC. 302. The analysis of chapter 7 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by deleting

"112. Assaulting certain foreign diplomats and other official personnel." and adding at the beginning thereof the following new item:

"112. Protection of foreign officials and official guests."

TITLE IV—PROTECTION OF PROPERTY OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

SEC. 401. Chapter 45 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"§ 970. Protection of property occupied by foreign governments

"(a) Whoever willfully injures, damages, or destroys, or attempts to injure, damage, or destroy, any property, real or personal, located within the United States and belonging to or utilized or occupied by any foreign government or international organization, by a foreign-official or official guest, shall be fined not more than \$10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

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H.R. 15883-4

"(b) For the purpose of this section 'foreign official', 'foreign government', 'international organization', and 'official guest' shall have the same meanings as those provided in sections 1116 (b) and (c) of this title."

Sec. 402. The analysis of chapter 45 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new

"9:0. Protection of property occupied by foreign governments."

SEC. 3. Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to indicate an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which its provisions operate to the exclusion of the laws of any State, Commonwealth, territory, possession, or the District of Columbia on the same subject matter, nor to relieve any person of any obligation imposed by any law of any State, Commonwealth, territory, possession, or the District of Columbia.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

APPROVED

OCT 241972

Vice. President of the United States and

President of the Senate.

Memorandum

TO

Mr. E. S. Miller

FROM

T. J. Smith 7JS

SUBJECT:

ACT FOR PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS AND OFFICIAL GUESTS OF THE UNITED STATES

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1 - Mr. Bates

1 - Mr. Dalbey

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller

1 - Mr. Cregar

1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

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Conrad
Dalbey
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Mitter, E.S.
Ponder

Soyars ______Walters _____Tele. Room ____ Mr. Kinley ____ Mr. Armstrong _

Ms. Herwig ____ Mrs. Neenan __

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On 10/19/72 Section Chiefs William O. Cregar and Thomas J. Smith, Domestic Intelligence Division, met with Section Chief Henry A. Schutz and SA General Investigative Division, concerning the responsibility each Division would have concerning the above-captioned new legislation. The following arrangement was agreed upon, subject to approval by Assistant Directors of each Division and the Acting Director.

l) General Investigative Division will handle all violations of the Act assigned to the FBI by the Department of Justice where there is no indication of political consideration, subversion or terrorist activity, but will handle all plane hijacking cases.

2) Domestic Intelligence Division will handle all violations of the Act assigned to the FBI by the Department where indications exist that political consideration, subversion or terrorist activity are involved in the violation, exclusive of plane hijackings.

It was recognized by the Agents discussing the matter that it will often be impossible to know at the outset if political consideration or subversion is involved. This could be particularly true in cases of murder and assault. However, our experience has shown that usually one of the primary factors in a case involving political considerations (which term is actually broad enough to cover subversion and terrorist activity) is the desire for publicity. Typically, an act of depredation or intimidation against a foreign official has been accompanied by a note or telephone call claiming credit for the act.

On the other hand, it was recognized that the converse may be true. A purely criminal act could be disguised behind a bogus

TJS:bjr & c.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller Re: Act for Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States

proclamation of a supposed terrorist. In either event it was believed that representatives of both Divisions would work in close harmony using the expertise of each so long as it was obviously necessary.

Domestic Intelligence Division certainly realizes that in cases of kidnaping the General Investigative Division has unique experience which must be utilized notwithstanding the fact it may not be a classical case of kidnaping for ransom. By the same token the Domestic Intelligence Division has a broad background and experience in dealing with extremists and terrorists and such knowledge should be beneficial to the General Investigative Division in some cases.

While the division of responsibility set forth above may appear to be oversimplified. it is believed that whenever a violation under the new statute occurs rapid deermination and agreement for supervisory responsibility can be made and that complete inter-Division cooperation will prevail. If after a case has been under investigation it develops that primary investigative responsibility has been assumed by the wrong Division, transfer of such responsibility can be reassigned if the Assistant Directors agree that such would be in the best interest of the Bureau.

RECOMMENDATION:

That inter-Division responsibility for supervision of violations growing out of the Act for Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States be established as set out above.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

1 - Mr. W. V. Creveland 7-2005 BY 60309

1 - Mr. R. E. Gebhardy mlt/elh

Mr. R. S. Miller

3/13/73

H. A. Boynton, Jr.

1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

(I) - Mr. E. S. Miller - A. I. Mr. H. A. Boynton, Jr.

OPERATIONS BY THE OFFICE OF 1 - Mr. J. E. Manning THE SECRETARY FOR DEFENSE
LIAISON MATTER

This memorandum sets forth the structure of the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense which may be utilized to support Bureau operations.

Attached is a copy of a memorandum T. J. Smith to Mr. E. S. Miller, 3/6/73, captioned "Use of Federal Troops To Assist The FBI." Memorandum concerns meeting between representatives of the Bureau, Department of Defense (DOD) and Attorney General's Office concerning Posse Comitatus Act. This memorandum does not concern that Act but rather the mechanics for obtaining support through the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Also attached is a letter to former Secretary of Defense Laird from the Attorney General.

The present situation involving the American Indian Movement (AIM) at Wounded Knee, South Dakota, necessitated DOD support for the Bureau on 3/2/73. Problems arose inasmuch as Department of Justice (DJ) representatives had previously contacted DOD officials concerning support such as aerial surveillance, shipment of gas masks and body armor. To better understand the DOD's apparent slowness in reacting to an FBI request, the following is set forth.

and also a He

nas two military assistants to his staff,

U. S. Army (USA), and

Any requests for military assistance and Air Force
transportation must be submitted to Office.

In other than routine matters involving support of civilian

Enclosures - 2

JEM: dlm (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

8/11/73

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b6 b7C Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller Re: Support for FBI Operations by the Office of the Secretary for Defense

agencies by DOD, cannot make a decision without	
first consulting the Office of the General Counsel of the	Signal of the state of the stat
Secretary of Defense. Mr. J. Fred Buzhardt. Previous contacts	•
with and have been most cordish and	
arrangements were made through them for the utilization of	b6
and the second control of the second control	b7C
of Bureau personnel carrying highly classified documents.	
Problems arose on 3/2/73 in the Office of	
that requests were being received from the Department and	
the Bureau concerning the situation at Wounded Knee. Request	
to transport weapons and ammunition via the U.S. Air Force	
necessitated an approval from Mr. Buzhardt's Office.	
advised that there can be only one contact from	
either the FBI or DJ with Office on an operation	
such as Wounded Knee. It was decided after a call from	
Mr. Buzhardt to that the Attorney General	
would be the noint of contact through his assistant	1
However, and continued to honor Eureau	-
requests on 3/2/73. at that time volunteered	
his services in the event the Bureau has a similar problem	
where the Bureau is the only agency involved. He stated	
that prior to a formal request, he is able to furnish infor-	
mation concerning the location of certain weapons and the	
means by which they may be transported.	
with some to be experient a real trace to make as the source bear as the source bear to the co	Ъб
On 3/2/73 when approval for the use of automatic	b7C
weapons by the Attorney General was received by Mr. Buzhardt	
in the late afternoon and the request submitted to	\neg
Office, and immediately contacted the	
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	
Directorate of Bilitary Support (UOAS) to locate the requested	
equipment and to transport it to Pine Ridge, South Dakota, by	
the most expeditious and cheapest means. Prior to this moment,	•
the Attorney General has given instructions that automatic	
weapons were not to be requested from DOD. DOMS may draw	
support from all the facilities of DOD. The locations of	t
weapons and equipment is computerized and aircraft is located	
through the Air Force for transportation. If necessary, the	
Air Force will contract for commercial carrier to get the	
equipment to its destination as fast as possible.	

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
Re: Support for FRI
Operations by the Office of
the Secretary for Defense

En the event a similar situation arises and the Bureau desires to determine what support may be obtained, it is suggested that Liaison Section be contacted to determine from or what type of support is available. The following items are necessary:

b6 b7C

- (1) A description of the type of equipment necessary;
- (2) The citation number of the Bureau's appropriation;

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b7C

- (3) Necessary documents of an authorization for Office.
- (4) If Bureau equipment is to be transported, the weight and cube and number of boxes are necessary.

As an example of the priorities and resources of DOMS a Special Air Mission (SAN) plane and helicopter were utilized on 3/3/73 to transport amunition from Quantico via Andrews Air Force Base to South Dakota. This was Bureau ammunition for Bureau weapons being utilized by Special Agents at Wounded Knee. It is to be pointed out that the request was submitted through the Attorney General's Office and in turn relayed to

For your information the military assistants in Office are highly selected representatives of brown the military. Former assistants in this Office include General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., currently Deputy Chief of Staff, USA, formerly Assistant to Dr. Kissinger; Mr. Alexander P. Butterfield who is Executive Assistant to the President and has been appointed by the President as Director of Federal Aviation Agency;

U. S. Military Academy. The above were Lt. Colonels serving as military assistants in the Office of the Special Assistant at sometime during the past ten years.

ACTION:

None. For information.

-3

8/17/13

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10-27-2005 BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh 5/17/73 Mr. E. S. Miller 1 - Mr. Gebhardt T. J. Smith 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller Mr. Putman - Mr. T. J. Smith NONMILITARY INCIDENTS WHICH COULD HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON OUR CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS l/Direct

_		 Referra
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Referral/Direct

By memorandum dated 4/4/73 to the Deputy Attorney General. attention of Mr. Charles D. Ablard, the Acting Director advised that the FBI already has contingency plans which will be implemented in the event of a terrorist attack involving Public Law 92-539 (Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States) and that the FBI will be direct contact with the Department of State Operations Center in this regard and that the DJIC will now also be notified in the event of aterrorist attack.

The attached letter to the Deputy Attorney General reiterates information furnished in our letter of 4/4/73 and points out the Intelligence Division will be the FBI's point of contact in all matters bearing an impact on foreign relations except aircraft hijackings which are handled by the General Investigative Division. Work hours and nonwork hours telephone numbers are set out for the information of the Deputy Attorney General.

RECOMMENDATION: That the attached letter be approved.

Enclosure

CEE:bjr (5)

G-1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 05-08-2006 BY 60309 auc tam/dcg/eMby 18, 1973

Acting Director, FBI

NONHILITARY INCIDENTS WHICH COULD HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON OUR CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

1 - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
- Mr. Putman
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

Reference is made to your memorandum of May 1, 1973, and my memorandum to the attention of Mr. Charles D. Ablard dated April 4, 1973, captioned as above.

As you are aware, the FBI maintains continuous around-the-clock operations in its 59 field offices and also at Headquarters. This includes a communications network. The three investigative Divisions at FBI Headquarters responsible for criminal and national security matters under the FBI's investigative jurisdiction maintain separate night and weekend duty offices to assure a continuity of investigative and dissemination responsibility.

Over a period of several years, the FBI, through its night and weekend duty offices, has kept the White House, Secret Service, Department of Justice, State Department, other appropriate agencies of the Government, and the intelligence community advised on a timely basis of all matters coming to its attention bearing on the national welfare.

As pointed out in referenced memorandum of April 4, 1973, the FBI, by virtue of its active participation in the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, already has contingency plans and will play a key role in the event of a terrorist attack involving Public Law 92-539. While FBI contingency plans provide for notification to a representative of the Criminal Division of the Department, it basically involves a direct liaison arrangement with the State Department where an FBI representative will be present in the State Department Operations Center. FBI contingency plans have been amended to also include notification to the Department of Justice Information Center. Since the Department of Justice will, of course, be represented at the State Department Operations Center and will

CEE:bjr

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

The Deputy Attorney General

be receiving simultaneously all information being furnished by the FBI directly to the State Department, we anticipate no continuing notification of developments due to the tremendous volume of communications traffic and manpower drain which will exist under emergency conditions.

For your information. Special Agent
Intelligence Division, is the FBI representative
who will report to the State Department Operations Center
in the event of a terrorist attack which falls under Public
Law 92-539. The Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism
specifically devised the procedures providing for direct
liaison between the FBI and State Department in the event of
a terrorist attack.

As noted in referenced memorandum of April 4, 1973, a Special Agent on duty in the Intelligence Division during nonwork hours should be the FRI's single point of contact during such hours in any matters bearing on the impact on foreign relations except aircraft hijackings. The telephone number in the Intelligence Division during nonwork hours is Code 175-2078 (202-324-2078). During regular work hours, calls should be directed to the office of Assistant Director Edward S. Miller, Intelligence Division, telephone Code 175-2121 (202-324-2121), as the FBI's initial point of contact except for aircraft hijacking matters.

Matters relating to aircraft hijackings are handled by the General Investigative Division and all inquiries related to such matters should be directed to that Division. The telephone number of the Special Agent on duty during non-work hours in the General Investigative Division is Code During work hours such inquiries should be directed to the office of Assistant Director Robert E. Gebhardt. General Investigative Division, telephone Code

The night and weekend duty Special Agents are under instruction to contact appropriate responsible officials of the PDI at any hour in the event of significant happenings. Incidents which could have an adverse impact on foreign relations would be sufficient reason to alert such officials.

You may be assured that as in the past all matters coming to the attention of the FBI of interest to the Department of Justice will be furnished to the Department of Justice on an expeditious around-the-clock basis.

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The Deputy Attorney General

NOTE:

See memorandum T. J. Smith to Mr. E. S. Miller dated 5/17/73, captioned as above, prepared by CEE:bjr.

8/17/73

G.4.

Mr. E. S. Miller

T. J. Smith

NON-MILITARY INCIDENTS WHICH COULD HAVE ADVERSE IMPACT ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/3/73 2005 BY .60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

1 - Mr. Gebhardt 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller Mr. Putman 1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

By letter dated 3/30/73 (attached), the Deputy Attorney General requested that a representative of the FBI attend a meeting at 2 p.m., 4/2/73, to discuss a requirement for the immediate preparation of a plan providing for prompt Departmental response on a 24-hour basis, to the currence of non-military incidents which could have an adverse impact upon the conduct of our foreign relations. Assistant Director E. S. Miller was designated by the Acting Director to go. SA T. J. Smith accompanied Mr. Miller.

The meeting was chaired by Mr. Charles D. Ablard,
Associate Deputy Attorney General. A memorandum (conv attached)
was distributed to each person attending the meeting.

Enclosures

Referral/Direct

TJS:bjr
(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

8/17/73

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller Re: Non-Military Incidents . Which Could Have Adverse Impact on Foreign Relations Referral/Direct Referral/Direct Our existing plan requires that we notify of the Criminal Division of the Department in case of a terrorist attack. Mr. Miller informed Mr. Ablard that we will also Referral/Direct notify DJIC of such attacks so that it will be informed of the matter. A letter with this information is attached for approval.

8/17/73

RECOMMENDATION:

Referral/Direct

That the attached letter be approved.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-08-2006 BY 60309
auc tam/dcg/elh
Altr: Mr. Charles D. Albard
April 4, 1973

Acting Director, FBI

NON-MILITARY INCIDENTS WHICH COULD HAVE ADVERSE IMPACT ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 1 - Mr. Gebhardt

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller

Mr. Putman

1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

Reference is made to your letter of March 30, 1973, requesting that an FBI representative attend a meeting April 2, 1973, in the Deputy Attorney General's Conference Room to discuss captioned matter.

As noted during the meeting, the FBI already has contingency plans which will be implemented in the event of a terrorist attack involving Public Law 92-538 (Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States) and will be in direct contact with the Department of State Operations Center in this regard.

As noted also, our contingency plan calls for our notification of Mr. Laurence McWhorter of the Criminal Division of the Department or such other official of the Criminal Division who may be designated in the future in the event of a terrorist attack. We will now add the Department of Justice Information Center (DIIC) telephone as a separate office within the Department to be notified in the event of a terrorist attack.

While DJIC is aware of our 24-hour operation in the FBI, for the record the number where an FBI Special Agent will be on duty for the Intelligence Division during nonwork hours is code 175-2078 (202-324-2078). This Special Agent should be considered the FBI's single point of centact during nonwork hours. At other times calls should be directed to the office of Assistant Director E. S. Miller, Intelligence Division, telephone: code 175-2121 (202-324-2121) as the FBI's initial point of contact.

TJS:bjr (7)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

8/17/73

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b2

The Deputy Attorney General

NOTE:

See memorandum T. J. Smith to Mr. E. S. Miller dated 4/3/73, captioned as above, prepared by TJS:bjr.

-2-

8/17/73

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 05-08-2006 BY 60309 auc tam/dcg/elh

ACT FOR THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS AND OFFICIAL GUESTS
OF THE UNITED STATES DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION CONTINGENCY PLAN

Notification Procedures

Both the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) and the General Investigative Division (GID) have responsibility for supervising violations coming within the purview of "Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States." In the main, DID responsibilities under the Act involve terrorist acts where violence is used, or the serious and imminent threat of such an act requiring immediate reaction; provided that the act has international political ramifications either because of its purpose or because of the individuals involved.

GID supervisory responsibilities are incurred upon a serious violation of the Act, such as a nonpolitically motivated or subversive kidnaping, murder, or assault and the like upon a victim covered by the Act. GID also handles all aircraft hijackings under the Act.

In the event of a serious violation of the Act supervised by DID, the following notification procedures will be adhered to, and the contingency plan hereinafter set forth will be activated. In the case of a violation of the Act supervised by GID, the following notification procedures will be followed.

Notify:

- (a) Assistant Director E. S. Maller, who will notify Mr. Felt, who, in turn, will notify Mr. Gray
- (b) Assistant Director Ra E. Gebhardt, GID
- (c) Section Chief W. Q. Cregar
- (d) Deputy Director for Operations

 Department of State Operations Center (DSOC)
- (e) <u>White Bous</u>e Situation Room
- (f) Secret Service Intelligence Division

(g) Section Chief, Criminal Section, GID, extension or during nonworking hours, GID Duty Supervisor, extension

(h) Supervisor (Div. 5) or his alternate, Supervisor (Div. 6), who are members of the Emergency Watch Group at the State Department

Note that thereafter in each case, as a double check, the DSOC will, in turn, notify the FBI, The White House Situation Room, Secret Service Intelligence Division, and the National Security Agency Command Center. In its return call to the FBI, the DSOC will maintain an open line.

Mr. Cregar will handle notification to Mr. Lawrence McWhorter, Department of Justice, telephone in these matters.

DID Command Center

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Location

The DID Command Center, hereinafter referred to as DCC, will be located in Room 1002, 9th & D Building, telephone extensions 2078 and 2079.

Chain of Command

The DCC will be under the direct supervision of Assistant Director Miller. Assisting Mr. Miller and in charge of coordinating the case and all incoming and outgoing communications will be the DID Section Chief having investigative responsibility for the terroristic act. In each case, Mr. Miller will designate the Section Chief to fill the post.

Manpower

At DCC

- (1) Section Chief in charge
- (2) Number 1 Man to be selected from Section involved
- (3) Security Patrol Clerks (2) (After duty hours only)
- (4) Clerk/Stenographers (2)

At other/locations

- (1) Supervisory Special Agents from Section affected and as needed
- (2) Sufficient clerical and stenographic personnel to be assigned if possible from Section affected
- (3) Upon proper notification, Supervisor

 DID, or his alternate, Supervisor

 GID, members of the Emergency

 Watch Group (EWG) will proceed to the DSOC,

b6 b7C

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room 7516 of the State Department. Supervisor or can be reached by use of the direct line to the DSOC and will receive all information flowing between the FBI and the EWG.

Communications

Telephone

Bureau extensions 2078 and 2079 presently serve DCC. Extensions 2121, 2122, and 2123 are extensions contiguous to DCC and can be used as back up extensions. The main telephone instrument has unclassified extension service to The White House Situation Room. Two extension instruments have a direct unclassified extension Department of State Operations Center extension Extension telephones also have extension service to the Guard Desk in the lobby of the 9th & D Building.

In addition to the above, the "Green" telephone and the "Grey" telephone provide secure voice service to the United States intelligence community. The "Green" telephone may be used for classified conversations with certain Legats.

Teletype

The DID teletype room adjacent to DCC operates on an around-the-clock basis.


Radio

Portable voice radio receivers-transmitters connect the messenger room at Justice with DCC and the courier truck.

Appended hereto are documents pertaining to applicable legislation, Departmental guidelines, agreements between the FBI and other U.S. Government agencies, agreements between DID and GID, and other material deemed to be of assistance to personnel handling these matters.

APPENDICES

- Appendix A H. R. 15883 "Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States."
- Appendix B Memorandum T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller dated October 27, 1972 - "Act for Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States."
- Appendix C Memorandum dated December 19, 1972, Deputy Attorney General, Criminal Division, to Acting Director "Assignment of Investigative Jurisdiction."
- Appendix D Memorandum dated October 27, 1972, from Ambassador Armin Meyer, Department of State, regarding "Administrative Machinery for Dealing with Terrorist Acts" and enclosing "Standard Procedures for Responding to International Terrorist Acts Occurring Within the United States" as approved by the Working Group, Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism.



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Notification Procedures

Both the Intelligence Division (ID) and the General Investigative Division (GID) have responsibility for supervising violations coming within the purview of "Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States." In the main, ID responsibilities under the Act involve terrorist acts where violence is used, or the serious and imminent threat of such an act requiring immediate reaction; provided that the act has international political ramifications either because of its purpose or because of the individuals involved.

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In the event of a serious violation of the Act supervised by ID, the following notification procedures will be adhered to, and the contingency plan hereinafter set forth will be activated. In the case of a violation of the Act supervised by GID, the following notification procedures will be followed.

Notify:

(a)	Assistant Director E. S. Miller, who will noting Mr. Callahan, who, in turn, will notify Mr. Ke	
(b)	Assistant Director R. E. Gebhardt, GID	
(c)	Section Chief F. S. Putman, Jr.	
(d)	Deputy Director for Operations Department of State Operations Center (DSOC)	
(e)	White House Situation Room	b2 b6 b7C
(f)	Secret Service Intelligence Division	
(g)	Section Chief, Criminal Section, GID, extension or during nonworking hours, GID Duty Supervisor, extension	
(h)	Supervisor (Div. 5) or his	

8/17/13

alternate, Supervisor (Div. 6), who are members of the Emergency Watch Group at the State Department.

b2 b6 b7C

(i) Department of Justice Information Center

Note that thereafter in each case, as a double check, the DSOC will, in turn, notify the FBI, The White House Situation Room, Secret Service Intelligence Division, and the National Security Agency Command Center. In its return call to the FBI, the DSOC will maintain an open line.

Mr. Putman will handle notification to

Department of Justice, telephone

in these matters.

ID Command Center

Location

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Manpower

At DCC

- (1) Section Chief in charge
- (2) Number 1 Man to be selected from Section involved
- (3) Security Patrol Clerks (2) (After duty hours only)
- (4) Clerk Stenographers (2)

At other locations

(1) Supervisory Special Agents from Section affected and as needed

8/17/13

(2) Sufficient clerical and stenographic personnel to be assigned if possible from Section affected

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b7C

Upon proper notification, Supervisor

ID, or his alternate, Supervisor

GID, members of Emergency

Watch Group (EWG) will proceed to the DSOC,

Room 7516 of the State Department. Supervisor

can be reached by use of the direct line to the DSOC and will receive all information flowing between the FBI and the EWG.

Communications

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Portable voice radio receivers-transmitters connect the messenger room at Justice with DCC and the courier truck.

Appended hereto are documents pertaining to applicable legislation, Departmental guidelines, agreements between the FBI and other U. S. Government agencies, agreements between ID and GID, and other material deemed to be of assistance to personnel handling these matters.

8/17/23

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			FBI	Domestic Council	NSC Staff			CIA	AGENCY		·
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									HOME		

8/17/13

-9-

UNITED STATES GOVERNMEN

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Gebhardt 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller Baker

Callahan Cleveland.

Conrad . Dalbey Gebhardt

Jenkins Marshall Miller, E.S.

Purvis

Tele, Room

Mr. Kinley .

Ms. Herwig _

Mr. Armstrong_

Mrs. Neenan ___

Mr. W. Mark Felt

DATE: 12/14/72

FROM

E. S. Miller

1 - Mr. Cregar

1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR ✓ TERRORIST ATTACK

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10-27-2005 BY 60309

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION am/mlt/elh

Cregar to Miller memorandum 11/10/72 captioned "Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism" (attached) enclosed a proposed contingency plan of Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) to be utilized to the extent necessary in the event of a terrorist act, supervision of which rests with DID.

Mr. Armstrong attached an informal memorandum to Mr. Kinley 11/14/72 in which he raises two questions:

"(1) Does not a murder or a kidnaping investigation require certain investigative expertise in all cases without regard to whether 'political consideration, subversion or terrorist activity' is involved?

"(2) If so, does DID, given the nature of its responsibilities, have the expertise to supervise these criminal investigations as effectively as they could be supervised by GID?"

Mr. Armstrong expressed opinion that these two questions should be answered in favor of GID.

In response to Mr. Armstrong's two questions and his opinion as to apparent lack of investigative expertise, I had a survey conducted of investigative expertise possessed by the Agents and officials of DID. I was quite impressed by the results of this survey.

The survey disclosed Agents in the Division have wide-ranging and impressive criminal investigative credentials, with extensive experience in some of the Bureau's major criminal cases.

The following is a statistical breakdown on the criminal experience of Agents in the Division. This is based on 125 Agents surveyed (total Division complement not surveyed due to leave; etc.)

Enclosure

46 JUN 13 1973 CONTINUEI

NOT RECORDED

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67 JUN 14 19/3

Memorandum to Mr. W. Mark Felt Re: Contingency Plans for Terrorist Attack

Domestic Intelligence Division

Total criminal investigative experience represented: 410 years.

Total criminal supervisory experience (field and FBI Headquarters): 87 1/2 years. (There is an additional 50 years relief supervisory experience represented.)

Total criminal investigative experience prior to Bureau employment: 22 years.

Eighteen Agents have had some substantial experience investigating murder cases under various classification, principally Crime on Government Reservations; in addition, a number of Agents have handled UFAP cases, including Top Ten Fugitives, in which murder was the local crime committed.

Thirty-two Agents have had experience in investigating Bureau kidnaping cases and several of these were the more highly publicized kidnapings of recent years (the Condetti case in Washington, D. C.; the Coors case in Denver; the Jackson kidnaping-murder case in Virginia; the Greenlease kidnaping in Kansas City, etc.).

A number of DID Agents either supervised or were case Agents on major Bureau cases. A selected few of these cases are listed since they serve as a good indicator of the depth of criminal investigative experience in this Division.

- 1) Chicago investigation regarding Chicago syndicate leader Paul "The Waiter" Ricca. DID Agent handled as case Agent in Chicago and coordinated with INS-IRS deportation hearings and bribery trial of Ricca.
- Anderson was killed by kidnaper; on-the-spot supervision afforded this case by DID Agent; under supervision of SAC, Agent was in charge of field forces at Shade Gap, Pennsylvania, from the time of killing of SA Anderson until kidnaper was shot and killed.
- 3) Major investigation in Miami in which a commercial Boeing 727 aircraft crashed, killing over 40 persons. This case was supervised in the field by an Agent currently assigned to DID.

Memorandum to Mr. W. Mark Felt

Re: Contingency Plans for Terrorist Attack
Domestic Intelligence Division

- 4) Gangland murder in Kansas City, Missouri, in 1965 handled by DID Agent as case Agent. Handled as special with 40 Agents from other offices ordered in.
- 5) Bank robbery investigation in Washington, D. C., in which two Bureau Agents were killed was assigned to an Agent currently in DID. This Agent is heavily experienced in bank robbery investigations (was case Agent in over 150 bank robbery cases); he was substantially involved in investigations which led to solution of Jackson kidnaping-murder case in the Washington, D. C., area.
- Pescons 6)- A civil rights special in 1967-1968 in the Charlotte Division was assigned to a DID Agent. Case resulted in arrest of 12 Klan members and numerous incidents of racial violence solved. This special involved as many of 48 Agents working on the case at one time.
- kionapines 7). Yablonski family murders in Pennsylvania in 1969 was a major case supervised by an Agent assigned to DID.
- 8) Another Agent in the Division, while assigned to Chicago in 1967, was supervisor of Dipbom case (bombings of Yugoslav Consulates in U. S.). Chicago was office of origin in this case.
- cases. For example, in the John Gilbert Graham bombing of the United Airlines plane in Colorado in the 1950's, a DID Agent had the specific assignment for investigation of all passengers and relatives. This culminated in the development of Graham as a suspect. The Condetti murder-kidnaping case in Washington, D. C., was solved by a particular witness; this witness was located by a DID Agent through line of investigation developed by the Agent.
- This Division has a number of investigative responsibilities which require "criminal-type" investigation. This, of course, includes bombing violations, investigations concerning Weatherman fugitives, violations of espionage statutes where evidence is gathered for prosecution and conspiracy-type cases such as the Eastcon case. The Revolutionary Activities Section supervises cases in the ITSP and Federal Reserve Act categories which arise out of fraudulent check schemes perpetrated by revolutionary extremists, and investigations are also conducted under the National Firearms Act in cases involving procurement of illegal arms.

Domestic intelligence i inte Memorandum to Mr. W. Mark Felt Re: Contingency Plans for Terrorist Attack by Dipomestic Intelligence Division and sending offices ordered 1. **OBSERVATIONS:** Agent is neav In response to Mr. Armstrong's first question, my personal libelief is that an investigator is an investigator. He obtains facts and Wthen takes the necessary action to bring his case to a logical conclusion. Experienced supervisory personnel at Headquarters do the same thing often in consultation with others. Therefore, it is my opinion, although they are important cases, that there is nothing unusually difficult about athese investigations from a supervisory standpoint. numerous indicents in racin willen, a sine. of 48 Agents In:answer to the second question, it is my opinion we most certainly have whatever "expertise" is necessary to handle murder and kidnaping investigations. I base my opinion on sixteen years field caexperience as an investigator, major case coordinator, supervisor on three different criminal desks, supervisor-in-charge of the Bank Robbery Unit at Headquarters, and ASAC responsible for criminal Wanvestigations in three offices. Chicago was office of ordern in this case I have great confidence in this Division and its personnel and can assure you that we can handle these investigations. cases. For example, in the John Galbert Granam company A RECOMMENDATION: ment for investigation of all passengers and delatines the developmeThat consideration be given to approving the contingency in plan attached with Cregar to Miller memorandum. Thereafter, copies lowill be furnished to all personnel having responsibilities under the plan. Master copy of the plan will be maintained in the DID Duty Supervisor's Office, 1002-9&D Building. Think in the statement of the réoure criminar-twe mwestigation. This, of course. Wiolations, itwestituding contains a espionage statutes whole évulence la collare

ALL DIRECTOR	MR. FELT
OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR	MR. BARES
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	MR. CALLAHAN
FEDERAL BUREAU OF JUSTICE	MR. CLEVEL AND
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hor 18 1972	MR. DALBEY
Domosmo mDecember 18, 1972	MR GEBHARDT
ALL INFORMATI	
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To: Mr. Kinley HEREIN IS UNC	105 BK. MAQZAQ 2.5. ——
This to ar ac	MR. MILLERO E.S.
Re: Contingency Plans for mlt/e	Th MR. PURVIS
manager Allack	MR SUTARS
Domestic Intelligence Division	MR. WALTERS
	TELE. ROOM
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Experience: Has Mr. Gray's illness or	
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

5010-106

Memorandum

E. Gebhardt 1 - Mr. 1 - F. S. Putman, Jr.

Mr. Baker

Mr. Callahan

Mr. Cleveland Mr. Conrad Mr. Gebhardt

Mr. Jenkins Mr. Marshall Mr. Miller, E.S.

Mr. Soyars ..

Tele. Room

Mr. Baise

Mr. Barnes Mr. Bowers

Mr. Herington

Mr. Thompson Mr. Walters .

Mr. E. S. Miller W.

DATE: 6/8/73

itman, Jr.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10-27-2005 BY 6030

SUBJECT:

CABINET COMMITTEE TO auc tam/mlt/elh COMBAT TERRORISM

Mr. Conmy Mr. Mintz On 6/6/73 captioned Committee met at the Department Mr. Eardley of State and a copy of the proposed agenda is attached. Also attached Mrs. Hogan is copy of memorandum pertaining to New Anti-Hijacking Measures, copy of a kidnapping log relating to Consul General Terrance Leonhardy and copy of a press release dated 5/31/73 containing remarks of Charles N. Browen.

During the meeting a discussion was held concerning enforcement of PL 92-539 and particularly the 100 foot harassment restrictions. The Department of State wanted a broader interpretation of the Harassment section and felt that the Department of Justice was affording this a too restrictive interpretation. Various cases were discussed and the Department of Justice stated that whenever the facts warranted an authorization would be forthcoming. They also pointed out that this law did not preclude local prosecution and that in many instances where the Soviets are objecting to a lack of Federal handling local arrests have been made.

Department of State representative proposed that the FBI have Agents at all demonstrations and make on the spot arrests for violations. He was advised that the Bureau's policy is to arrest only following an authorization and that while we would have Agents in the vicinity in an effort to develop evidence, we would not in any manner attempt to police a demonstration and would not be making any on the spot arrests for alleged violation of the harassment section of the statute.

Also discussed was possible legislation preventing ransom payments by American companies abroad. Ambassador Meyer noted that this was merely an idea on his part and nothing has been written formally. Legal representative to the Department of State felt that such a law could be passed (I believe this is questionable) but that such a law would never get through Congress. The representative from the Department of Treasury noted that Secretary Shultz is particularly disturbed about this problem and they are attempting to see what might be done and in particular how these extremist actions are affecting our foreign investments.

Enclosures

ACTION!

None. For information.

JUN 14 1973

UNRECORDED COPY FILED

UNITED STATES GOV **IMENT**

emorandum

CABINET COMMITTEE TO SUBJECT COMBAT TERRORISM



1 - F. S. Putman, Jr.

DATE: 6/18/73

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10-27-2005 BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

Mr. Baker Mr. Callahan Mr. Cleveland Mr. Conrad . Mr. Gebhardt Mr. Jenkins Mr. Marshall Mr. Miller, E.S. Mr. Soyars . Mr. Thompson Mr. Walters . Tele. Room Mr. Baise Mr. Barnes Mr. Bowers Mr. Herington Mr. Conm Mr. Mihtz Mr. Eardle Mrs. Hogal

Captioned Committee met on 6/13/73, and a copy of the agenda is attached. During the meeting, a draft proposal of a memorandum for the President was submitted which is also attached. This memorandum reports progress of the Committee. No portions of this memorandum offect the FBI and no comments were necessary.



During the conference, a discussion was again held concerning the Justice Department's failure in the eyes of the State Department to give a more liberal interpretation to harassment under PL 92539. The FBI's position as a investigator and not as a policing agency was again set forth. It was decided there was a need for closercoordination between the State Department and the Department of Justice and the Department of Justice representative agreed to discuss this statute further with U.S. Attorney in New York. The Justice Department was not willing (FBI concurs) to any blanket authorization for harassment violations under this statute. However, the Justice Department did agree that in certain instances it might be advisable to have an Assistant U. S. Attorney on the scene during violations to make authorizations at that time.

ACTION:


ST-102

None. For information. 116360-35

Enclosures

JUN 21 1973

FSP:cae



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FROM

SUBJECT:

UNITED STATES

Mr. E. S. Miller

Memorandum

ABINET COMMITTEE TO

COMBAT TERRORISM



1 - F. S. Putman, Jr.

DATE: 6/25/73

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10-28-2005 BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

Mr. Felt Mr. Baker . Mr. Callahan Mr. Cleveland Mr. Conrad Mr. Gebhardt Mr. Jenkins Mr. Marshall Mr. Miller, E.S. Mr. Soyars Mr. Thompson Mr. Walters Tele. Room Mr. Baise Mr. Barnes Mr. Bowers Mr. Herington Mr. Conmy Mr. Mintz _ Mr. Eardley _ Mrs. Hogan _

Production Pro

The working group of captioned Committee met on June 20, 1973. A copy of the agenda is enclosed along with copy of the minutes of this meeting. Also enclosed is a memo containing a rundown of the protection for the Brezhnev party, as well as a memorandum concerning a conversation with Consul General Leonhardy.

ACTION:

PENCLOSURE ATTACHED

Enclosures

FSP:cae

REC-19 62-115-360

7 JUN 26 1973 :

5 PSP

59 JUL 9 1972

For information.

1 - F. S. Putman

TO Mr. E. S. Mill& DATE: 7/10/73

FROM

Putman, Jr.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10-28-2005 BY 60309

‡am/mlt/elh SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBA

5010-106

TERRORISM

Attached is a copy of the agenda for the Working Group on June 27, 1973, as well as a copy of a memorandum which has been prepared for submission to the President from the Working Group.

No minutes of captioned meeting have been received. Nothing affecting FBI.

ACTION:

None. For information.

Enclosures o

FSP:cae

ST-109

REC-61 62-115360=38

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Mr. Felt Mr. Baker _ Mr. Callahan Mr. Cleveland Mr. Conrad Mr. Gebhardt Mr. Jenkins Mr. Marshall Mr. Miller, E.S. Mr. Soyars . Mr. Thompson Mr. Walters Tele. Room Mr. Baise Mr. Barnes Mr. Bowers Mr. Herington Mr. Conmy . Mr. Mintz Mr. Eardley Mrs. Hogan

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller 1 - Mr. F. S. Putman

Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 7/17/73

FROM

SUBJECT:

TO

F. S. Putman

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10-28-2005 BY 60309

PRESIDENT'S CABINET COMMITTEE

TO COMBAT TERRORISM

ED 0309

4

The members of the working group of captioned committee met on July 11, 1973. Attached is copy of the agenda as well as copy of the minutes. Pertinent parts of this meeting which affected the FBI have been handled by separate memorandum.

ACTION:

None. For information.

Enclosures - 2

FSP: j lb jlb (3)

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Assoc. Dir. Asst. Dir.:

Admin. _

Comp. Syst.

Inspection Intell, ____

Laboratory ____ Plan, & Eval, _

Spec. Inv. _

Training ___ Legal Coun.

Cong. Serv.

Corr. & Crm.

Press Off. _____
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

Files & Com. _ Gen. Inv. ____ Ident. ____

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EX-105

REC-67 62-115360-39

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7.0 JUL 2 4 1973

TO

Mr. E.

FROM

Putman

SUBJECT:

PRESIDENT'S CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT TERRORISM

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller 1 - Mr. F. S. Putman

> 7/17/73 DATE:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10-28-2905 auc tam/mlt

b6 b7C Assoc. Dir. Asst. Dir.: Admin. Comp. Syst. Files & Com. Gen. Inv. Inspection Intell. _ Laboratory Plan. & Eval. Training. Legal Coun. Cong. Serv. Corr. & Crm. Research Press Off. __ Telephone Rm. ___ Director Sec'y _

Members of the working group of captioned committee met on June 27, 1973, and a copy of the minutes is attached. Also attached is memorandum of dated June 27, 1973, pertaining to measures taken to counter terrorism during the period January 1 to June 5, 1973. Nothing contained in either affect the FBI.

ACTION:

None. For information. Enclosures - 2

FSP: j1byll (3)

<u>SI-106</u> REC 23

12-115360

22 JUL 18 1973

57JUL 27 1973

Mr. Felt.

Mr. Baker Mr. Callahan

Mr. Cleveland Mr. Conrad ir. Gebhardt

år. Miller, E.

Soyars

Thompson . Valters .

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. Jenkins

ALL INFORMÀTION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10-28-2005 BY 60309 auc tamunitisih1973

REC-15

2-115360-41

Honorable Armin H. Meyer Special Assistant to the Secretary X-105 Department of State Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Mr. Meyer:

Thank you for writing on June 28th and commenting as you did concerning the participation of Assistant Director Miller and Special Agents Branigan, Cregar, Putman and Smith in connection with the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism. I am pleased to know of your high regard for their performances and contributions and you may be sure they share my gratitude for your thoughtfulness in writing.

Sincerely yours,

MAILED 4 JUL 131973

FBI

C. M. Kelley

Clarence M. Kelley Director

- Mr. Miller - Enclosure Personal Attention: Bring to the attention of Special Agents William A. Branigan, William O. Cregar, Forrest S. Putman and Thomas J. Smith.

NOTE: Bufiles disclose prior cordial correspondence with Upon approval, this letter should be routed to the Personnel Records Unit of the Files and Communications Division so that appropriate personnel file copies may be prepared.

TELETYPE UNIT

MAIL ROOM 🔽

SECRET OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY-1962 EDITION GSA GEN, REG, NO. 27 UNITED STATES VERNMENT Mr. R. E. Gebhardt Aemorandum -\Mr. F. S. Putman, Jr. TO Mr. E. S. Mill DATE: 7/30/73DATE: 05-08-2006 Laboratory CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc #am/dcg/elh Forrest S. Putma DECLASSIFY ON: 25% 3. 05-08-2031 CABINET COMMITTEE TO SUBJECT: COMBAT TERRORISM Press Off. :Referral/Direct ALL INFORMATION CONTAINTS TO Director Secy HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT ACTION: None. For information. Enclosure REG-SS 62-115360-9 FSP:cae PENCLOSURE ATTACHED AUG 7 1973 (3) nyt ST-104 **Caug 1 6 1973**

FIDENTIAL VERNMENT UNITED STATES Q Asst. Dir.; 1 - Mr. R. E. Gebhardt Admin. _ Memorandum 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller Comp. Syst. Files & Com. Gen. Inv. . Mr. E. S. Miller Ident. _ DATE: 7/31/73то Inspection Intell. Laboratory DATE: 05-08-2006 Plan. & Eval. FROM Forrest S CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tamadacg/ell 3.3 (1, 6 Training -DECLASSIFY ON: 05-08-2031 Cong. Serv. SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO Corr. & Crm. COMBAT TERRORISM Research Press Off. .. Referral/Direct Telephone Rm. __ Director Sec'y ___ (C)(C) This would include determination as it relates to local protection (approved in memorandum Putman to Miller dated 7/16/73). Referral/Direct Meeting of 7/18/73 requires no action by the FBI. b6 PER FBI ACTION: b7C None. For information. ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE **Enclosures** FSP:cae EX-103

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller 1 - Mr. F. S. Putman

Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 7/16/73

FROM

TO

F. S. Rutman

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11-16-2005 BY 60309

SUBJECT:

CABINET COMMITTEE ON TERRORISMam/mlt/elh

On 7/11/73, working group of captioned

Committee met. A discussion was held concerning the

Alon murder and the new head of this working group, Ambassador

Hoffacker 'was in attendance. Attached is copy of Department of

State telegram concerning terrorism as it relates to a possible

convention on taking of hostages. This is for information

purposes only.

Also attached is copy of a working paper relating to a review of the Brezhnev visit. This paper on page three proposes to recommend that a centralized file should be kept by FBI of all incidents and arrests, Federal or local, of individuals that could pose a threat to the security of a visiting diplomatic delegation. Follow-ups should be made on court dispositions of these cases.

This is much too broad for the Bureau to comply with. However, it would be possible for us to maintain a list of all incidents falling under Public Law 92-539 (Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States).

Since correspondence is received on these incidents it would be a simple matter to maintain a centralized listing of these cases. However, to fully comply with this request we would have to maintain these cases in a pending status and have the field offices determine if local prosecution has been undertaken. It does not appear this would be an unreasonable hardship on the Bureau and such information would be of value in fully analyzing the implementation of this Law.

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AUG 7 1973

Enclosures - 200

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17.

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller Re: Cabinet Committee on Terrorism

RECOMMENDATION:

If you agree, we will undertake to maintain a centralized file showing the incidents and individuals involved, where known, of all violations of Public Law 92-539. We will also instruct the field offices to follow each case which is deferred for local handling to determine if local prosecution is undertaken.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINEDAssoc. Dir. HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED Admin. DATE 10-28-2005 BY 60309 Comp. Syst. R. E. Gebhardth Files & Jonn. ___ Ident. Intel Plan & Eval. Spec. Inv. Training Legal Coun. Cong. Serv. Corr. & Crm. Research Press Off. Telephone Rm. ___

The Rand Corporation is presently conducting Director Sec'y _ a survey and preparing a report in connection with terrorist activities, particularly as it relates to kidnappings b7C

On this date I was contacted by Mr. John Gatch, Deputy Coordinator of the working group of this committee who advised me that Rand Corporation officials were desirous of talking with FBI officials in connection with this matter. was subsequently contacted by Steven T. Hosmer, who stated that he is doing the study for the Rand Corporation along with a and they would be desirous of talking with people

from the FBI concerning barricades and hostage situations and in particularly obtaining any information concerning the deportment of hostages and their relationship with the kidnappers. Although no classified material is involved, Mr. Hosmer stated that both he and are cleared for classified information. REC 68 62-1/5

The above appears to be a logical request and could be of assistance in furnishing a profile relating to hostagetype terrorist acts.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

EX-103

23 AUG 10 1973

That this be referred to Division 6 and that the Kidnapping Desk contact Mr. Hosmer at 296-5000 and discuss the hostage situation and kidnapping matters with him.

> b6 b7C

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No pertinent into in indices fe Hosmer or

Godar Herritan

lemorandum

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller

1 - Mr. F. S. Putman

Уто

Mr. E. S. Mille

7/30/73DATE:

Forrest Putman, Jr. ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10-28-2005 BY 603

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CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT TERRORISM

Files & C Telephone Rm Director Sec'y

Assoc. Dir

Asst. Dir.:

Comp. Syst.

Attached is copy of a memorandum dated 7/27/73 from Ambassador Hoffacker enclosing a proposed draft of a memorandum Pickering - to - Garment relating to diplomatic requests for additional security protection.

Memorandum is self-explanatory and no comments necessary from the FBI. It is noted that the Cabinet Committee fully understands that the FBI does not have any protective responsibilities but only investigative responsibilities under PL 92539.

ACTION:

None. For information.

Enclosure

FSP:cae

ALL INFORMATION CONTAPNED OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 S UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT OWN OTHERWISE UNITED STATES VERNMENT Assoc. Dir. Asst. Dir.: Memorandum 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller Admin. Comp. Syst. _ 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar Files & Com. ___ 1 - Mr. F. S. Putman Gen. Inv. _ Mr. E. S. Miller Ident. _ DATE: 8/10/73 Inspection . DATE: 05-08-2006 Intell. Plan. & Eval. _ CLASSIFIED BY 60309 awc_tam/dcq/ Putman, Jr. DECLASSIFY ON: 25X Spec. Inv. -Training _ 05-08-2031 Legal Coun. Cong. Serv. _ CABINET COMMITTEE TO Corr. & Crm. COMBAT TERRORISM Research . Press Off. _ Telephone Rm. __ Director Sec'y ___ Nothing affecting FBI interest involved. Referral/Direct **ACTION:** None. For information. REC-15_ 62-115360 Enclosures ST-104 **23** AUG 15 1973 FSP:cae (4) QY 的部分全有各种

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10-27-2005 BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

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